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Özet 
 
Fransa’da 80’lerin sonunda Müslüman öğrencilerin devlet okullarına 
başörtüsü ile gelmeleri üzerine ortaya çıkan tartışma 90’larda hız kazandı. 
Kamusal alanda dinsel sembollerin varlığı, diğer Avrupa ülkelerinde de 
kaygı uyandırdı. Fransa, Almanya ve İngiltere’de başörtüsü tartışmasının 
ortaya çıkışlarının izini süren bu tez, başörtüsünün bu ülkelerde bir sorun 
olarak kurgulandığını savunuyor. Avrupa’daki Müslümanların sayılarının 
artmasının ve bir tehdit olarak algılanan İslam’ın siyasallaşmasının, 
başörtüsünün bir sorun olarak kurgulanmasını sağlayan koşulları da 
belirlediğini tartışıyor. Roland Barthes’ın semiyolojik mit çözümlemesi 
kullanılan araştırmada, Avrupa’da tartışıldığı biçimiyle başörtüsünün bir 
sembol olmakla kalmayıp mitleştirildiği öne sürülüyor. Bu mit çözümlemesi 
de, başörtüsü mitinin Avrupa’daki Müslümanların varlığını doğallaştırırken, 
Avrupa’nın kendi din ve sömürge tarihinden kaçışına işaret ettiğini 
gösteriyor. Dolayısıyla, başörtüsü tartışması bir yandan dinsel özgürlüklerle, 
diğer yandan Avrupa’nın kendi tarihini uzaklaştırarak bir kimlik 
oluşturmasıyla ilgilidir.  
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Abstract 
 
The debate on Muslim girls’ wearing headscarves to public schools 
has emerged in France in the late 80s and gained a momentum during the 
90s. The presence of religious symbols in the public sphere has been 
evocative in other European countries as well. In tracing the emergences of 
the headscarf debate in France, Germany and England, this dissertation 
argues that the headscarf is constructed as a problem in these countries. It 
discusses the circumstances in which it was possible to construct headscarf 
as a problem are the growing Muslim presence in Europe and the concern of 
politicization of Islam which was construed as a threat. This study, by using 
the semiological myth analysis of Roland Barthes, proposes that the 
headscarf, as it is discussed in European countries, is not a symbol but rather 
that it is mythified. This myth analysis shows that the myth of headscarf 
naturalizes the Muslim presence in Europe, and in doing so it signifies the 
flight of Europe from its religious and colonial history. Hence the headscarf 
debate is on the one hand related with the religious freedoms, but on the 
other hand it is about the formation of a European identity through 
distancing its history.  
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Introduction 
In an era when we try to delineate the range of globalization through 
its economical and socio-cultural effects in our societies and investigate 
social transformations, we have to remind ourselves that change does not 
occur similarly with the same consequences everywhere, in every aspect of 
our lives. If one element of post-capitalist era of globalization is the 
dissemination of information, another element which has challenged the 
organization of societies is the outcome of the movement of people. The 
long twentieth century has witnessed the rise of nations which had 
established borders and barriers and homogenized populations. But it has 
also witnessed upheavals which has transformed or challenged these 
barriers, especially during the second half of the century. The European 
countries which have induced much movement in the world have become 
the destination for many people. While the newcomers tried to benefit as 
much as possible and pursue their living in their hosting countries, the 
cultural and legal changes they evoked in these host countries were shaped 
by mutual expectations and forms of recognitions. The legal status of 
newcomers, the limits of their participation in the public sphere, the cultural 
conflicts and their upheavals against the various forms of discrimination 
necessitated a critical investigation of immigrants’ position in European 
countries. Although it is still a concern and source of much debate what the 
European integration will bring about to the function of nation-state, one of 
the major consequences of the European Union is to force the states to 
become more considerate in their integration policies and conflict 
resolutions.  
The growing number of Muslim populations in the European 
countries and their claim to their cultural identities have led to the 
emergence of the veiling issue: a debate which coincided with the issues of 
integration of the Muslim people; of the religious identity of the European 
Union; the legislative core of the Union; the polarization effect of 
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September 11, 2001, in Europe which has augmented after the invasion of 
Iraq. The debate has emerged with regards to the public presence of 
headscarf in public education especially in France and Germany, and 
became the site of problems which propelled dilemmas in the face of the 
history of civil liberties and secularization in Europe.  
The presence of Muslim people in European countries and their 
claim to their religious rights have reopened the debate of secularization, a 
process which was supposed to be fulfilled, and have provided an argument 
for the supporters of a radical interpretation of secularism. The ways the 
European countries manage the issue are important for various reasons. The 
issue might be considered as a test case in the face of the civil heritage of 
what has been gained by secularization in Europe: the emergence of the 
headscarf issue provides evidence for the apparently unresolved relations 
between state and society in terms of the question of where religion belongs 
to. The debate surfaces the age-long controversies; hence the issue acts as a 
touchstone for the European countries in the first hand. Moreover, the 
handling of the issue has a say to both Muslim societies outside Europe and 
the countries which have taken the European model of organization between 
the religious institutions and civil society. It is of vital importance for 
Turkey as well with a vast majority of Muslim citizens and the 
establishment of a secular constitution, who looks forward to being a 
member of the European Union.  
As the analysis in this dissertation is limited to European countries, 
the way the headscarf was constructed as a problem in Turkey will be 
disregarded. This dissertation will neither investigate the case in Turkey nor 
make a comparative analysis between the issue in Turkey and Europe. On 
the other hand, the analysis will have a bearing on Turkey’s case. Although 
at first sight the headscarf issue in Europe might seem to be a similar to the 
debates of secularism and liberties built around the presence of headscarf in 
Turkey, the contexts of problematization are different. In this respect, in 
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order to have a comprehensive approach to the problematization of veiling 
in Turkey, the tension between secularization and liberties would have to be 
grasped with a perspective of the peculiar history of reformations dating 
back the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. 
In Turkey, the headscarf debate has emerged as a part of the political 
agenda in the 80s. Its emergence has been interpreted as a need to 
reconsider the dynamics of Kemalist modernization. The veil has become a 
politically overladen issue, and the debate growing around it polarized the 
society: the modernists considered headscarf as the surfacing of the Islamist 
movement which is critical of the Kemalist Reformation, seeing the act of 
veiling as a symbol of a will to retreat to a religious organization of the 
society; while the Islamists have often referred to civil rights and liberties of 
worshipping that have been partially secured by the constitution. This 
polarization of the society has drained any attempt to reconsider the issue 
with other terms than suggested. Hence, headscarf has been perceived either 
as a symbol of a threat to secular constitution, or a claim to a civil right in 
favor of the Islamists. The polarization of the debate compelled one to side 
either with secularist Kemalists who approve the exclusion of veiling 
women from universities or with Islamists.1  
The tension that emerged around the veiling of students or public 
officials in European countries is related on one hand with the Muslim 
religion becoming more and more visible in the public sphere, and on the 
hand with the present perceptions of the position of religion in society in 
general. So the debate of headscarf (l’affaire du foulard) which is 
considered peculiar to France will not be examined as an exception. My 
intention is not to present and examine how different actors in the society 
                                                 
1  See Nilufer Gole The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999, (1996) for a sociological analysis of veiling university 
students repositioning their religious identities after 80’s in Turkey. 
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has taken up or reacted to the issue in France. Instead, the focus will be the 
circumstances and discourses which helped the problem of veiling to 
emerge in three countries. In Europe, the countries relevant to the analysis 
will be confined to three countries: Germany, France and Great Britain. 
These countries have no fewer than twelve million of Muslims out of about 
fifteen millions of Muslim people living in European countries. These 
countries have adopted different forms of integration policies towards the 
newcomers among which Muslims present a diversity of origin. 
Furthermore, these three countries represent the major Christian 
denominations in Europe except the Orthodox Church. 
The reasons and motives why students and women wear headscarves 
will not be a concern in the present study, but not because such a concern is 
worthless. The change in the attitude of Muslim women in European 
countries towards veiling and the way they explain their act of veiling can 
be analyzed and would provide great insight about the experience of Islam 
in European countries. However, I would like to return to the instance 
before such an explanation was needed and trace the moments through 
which headscarf was constructed as a problem. 
 Many Muslim women believe that wearing a headscarf is a means to 
practice their religion: to discuss whether or not they are justified by the 
Koran or Hadiths is a dead-end discussion. Moreover, the fact that the veil 
was/is being used as a way to oppress women does not eliminate the 
indisputability of belief. However, those who are ready to see headscarf as a 
sign of oppression of women stigmatize the headscarf and ignore the 
economical and social means through which the patriarchal dominance 
continues, especially in Muslim dominated societies. I argue that they 
employ a myopic focus in explaining away the status of women in society 
with veiling. The oppression lies not in the object (headscarf) itself, but in 
the whole ideology by means of which its presence or absence acts upon 
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women. So, I propose that forced veiling, as well as forced unveiling are 
acts of violence. 
If the act of unveiling has a liberating potential, so does the 
act of veiling. It all depends on the context in which such an act is 
carried out or, more precisely, on how and where women see 
dominance. Difference should be defined neither by the dominant 
sex nor by the dominant culture. So when women decide to lift the 
veil, one can say that they do so in defiance of their men’s 
oppressive right to their bodies. But when they decide to keep or put 
the veil once they took off, they might do so to reappropriate their 
space or to claim a new difference in defiance of genderless, 
hegemonic, centered standardization.2
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the tension re-created with 
the problem of headscarf in the light of religious freedoms and the 
discourses of secularism in Europe. The case of headscarf and different 
issues emerging with respect to and around veiling will be approached from 
the perspective of the relations between society, religion and the state which 
were supposed to have reached a balance in the 20th century in Europe. The 
crucial questions are: how does a dress code became so overladen? How did 
it begin to signify so diverse symbolic meanings? But before asking these, 
the foremost question is how in the first instance, did it become possible to 
question the presence of headscarf in schools and consider it as a matter to 
be resolved?  
Instead of adopting an agent-based analysis of the debate, either of 
the Muslim women who wear headscarf or those who favor to delimit its 
presence for various reasons, I chose to employ the point of view of the 
                                                 
2 Minh-Ha, Trinh T. “Not You/Like You: Postcolonial Women and the 
Interlocking Questions of Identity and Difference.” Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, 
and Postcolonial Perspectives. Eds. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, c1997, 2002. p. 416.  
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headscarf itself, which gains and loses meanings. In assessing the social 
tensions in this debate, the semiological analysis of Roland Barthes is going 
to be used in order to analyze headscarf as a sign. The main objective is to 
analyze the dimensions through which a dress form as a cultural artifact can 
become to bear symbolic meanings. 
The headscarf problem in European countries is on the one hand 
related with the integration of religious minorities and on the other hand 
with the Muslim immigrants who started to be considered as a social group 
in relation to the problem of Islam. The way the headscarf has been 
constructed as a problem is eventually related with how the Europeans 
perceive themselves, and with the question of European identity. The first 
chapter will present the first instances where the issue of headscarf became 
a public debate in Britain, France and Germany. Aside from academic 
studies which have investigated the issue in Europe, the main source of 
information on the emergence of this issue is the news sources accessed 
largely via internet. It will be discussed that although the solutions adopted 
in these countries are different, the construction and perception of headscarf 
in these countries were similar. In the second chapter, the analysis will 
move towards the circumstances which made possible to problematize 
headscarf in Europe. The growing fear of political Islam and the rise of the 
rhetoric of antagonism between “West” and “Muslim world” will be 
examined. In addition, the issue of Muslim presence in Europe will be 
analyzed as a recent attempt to define a European identity in which the 
Muslims are projected as the “other” of Europeans. The third chapter will 
return from the surrounding and underlining issues of headscarf to the 
headscarf itself and suggest that headscarf has not only become a symbol, 
but it has been constructed as a myth. This last chapter will propose a 
Barthean myth analysis of headscarf in order to show the dynamics through 
which headscarf as a form of cloth could come to signify many diverse 
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symbolic connotations. The myth analysis of headscarf makes possible to 
evaluate the discourses of secularism in relation to religious freedoms.  
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1 - The Emergence of the Headscarf Debate 
A Brief Historical Background 
 From the end of 80s onwards, the Muslims in European countries 
have attained a dubious public attention through the scarves of Muslim 
students or teachers in schools. The question whether the Muslim girls (or 
teachers) should to be allowed to wear scarves at school evolved into a 
question of the symbolic significance of the Muslim headscarf. This 
growing debate has been taken from various perspectives and began to 
include the issues of integration of Muslims, politicization of Islam, 
ghettoization of Muslim populations, and the conformity of Islam with 
modernity. One approach is to interpret the headscarf debate as the 
surfacing part of a giant iceberg where the relevant problems connected to 
the Muslim presence in Europe are taken into consideration. However, such 
an approach would stigmatize the headscarf debate and would lead to 
dismiss the fact that in different European countries, the headscarf debate 
aroused in varying degrees and tensions, which were related to the previous 
attitudes developed with respect to minorities, immigration and 
secularization. The following account of the emergence of this debate aims 
to provide an insight on the similarities and diversities in the ways and in 
the terms through which the headscarf became a subject of a cultural and 
political debate in different European countries.  
Britain 
 In Britain, in 1988, the governors of the Altrincham Grammar 
School in Manchester decided that headscarves were a hazard when worn in 
school laboratories or gyms and ordered they be banned in classes.3 In 
                                                 
3 AlSayyad, Nezar. “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity 
and Culture.” Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age 
of Globalization. Eds. Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells. Berkeley: Lexington Books, 
2002. p. 11. 
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January 1990, the matter was discussed among the sixteen governors of the 
school who decided that the students would be allowed to wear dark blue 
scarves conforming to school colors, whereas the ban would continue in the 
labs and gyms. Instead of banning the students from wearing all types of 
headscarves as done in France in 2004, in Britain, the headscarves were 
perceived as an expression of religious commitment, yet the discussions 
continued with respect to the types of scarves and the possible hazards when 
worn in gym classes. Since the schools were setting their own uniform 
policies, the schools’ governing bodies were setting the line between the 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of scarves in terms of either being 
hazardous, or more generally of creating a division among pupils. For 
example, in 2002, a student of Denbigh high school in Luton, Shabina 
Begum was sent back home when she came to school with jilbab (a long 
gown covering all body except hands and face) instead of her usual and 
accepted shalwar kameez (trousers and tunic). The school governors argued 
that adopting the jilbab would create a division between the students where 
the majority of them were Muslims, fearing that students wearing jilbab 
might be regarded as better Muslims.4 After forced to change her school and 
losing her case in high court, the Appeal Court judges ruled in March 2005 
that although the school had the right to set a school uniform policy, it had 
acted against the student’s right to express her religion by expelling her, a 
right recognized by English law.5 This ruling might be interpreted as having 
implications for the schools to review their uniform policies in order to 
                                                 
4 “Jilbab ruling for Muslim pupils ‘would be divisive’” The Guardian 28 May 
2004. 11 May 2005. <http://education.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,493460-
110908,00.html>. 
5 “Schoolgirl wins Muslim gown case.” BBCNews March 2, 2005. 12 May 2005. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/england/beds/bucks/herts/4310545.stm>. 
Aslam, Dilpazier. “Schoolgirl tells Guardian of her battle to wear Islamic dresses.” 
The Guardian 3 March 2005. 11 May 2005 
<http://education.co.uk/faithschools/story/0,13882,1429172,00.html>. 
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respect cultural and religious diversities, and it accords with the general 
multiculturalist tendency in Britain where the public officers such as 
Metropolitan police officers or court officers can cover their heads.  
France 
 It is in France that the students’ wearing headscarves in public 
schools created the most vigorous and long controversies over the individual 
rights and secularism. As the debate became public, many different views 
and arguments have been and still being voiced. In 1989, the principal of a 
high school in Creil, a suburb of Paris, expelled three girls from school for 
wearing Islamic headscarves in class. The girls were two Moroccan sisters, 
14 year-old Leila and 13 year-old Fatima Achaboun, and Tunisian 14 year-
old Samira Aaeedani.6  Through demonstrations and the interest of the 
media, the event attained public attention. Lionel Jospin, the France 
Education Minister at the time, decided that the girls should be ‘persuaded’ 
to remove their veils in class, but if they refuse to do so, they should still be 
allowed to attend the class.7 He argued that the contrary would be a form of 
religious discrimination. When this decision has been rejected both by some 
of the teachers union and by the members of the Socialist Party to which 
Jospin was a member, and Prime Minister Michel Rocard referred the 
matter to the Council of State for a decision. The state council decreed that 
the head teacher had overstepped his rights and the girls were re-schooled.8 
The ruling allowed each school to settle the issue as it saw fit. However, in 
1992, the Council of State overturned its original ruling. The wearing of 
                                                 
6 AlSayyad, Nezar. “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity 
and Culture.” Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age 
of Globalization. Eds. Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells. Berkeley: Lexington Books, 
2002. p. 12. 
7 Ibid.  
8 “Schools’ bid for headscarf ban widens French divide.” The Observer 15 June 
2003. 23 April 2005. <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/islam/story/0,1442,977747,00.html> 
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headscarves further increased in popularity: although in 1989, only ten 
children were registered as wearing headscarf to school, by 1994 this 
number had risen to two thousands.9 The French government declared on 
September 10 1994 that “it would ban the wearing of headscarves in public 
schools, since the practice violated the tradition of secular education in 
France.”10 In a published interview, Education Minister Francois Bayrou 
said that he was going to deliver instructions to principals of all public 
schools to enforce a ban immediately. He said that his instructions would be 
clear: “We will continue to accept discreet religious signs, as has always 
been the case. But we cannot accept ostentatious signs that divide our 
youth.”11  
 The wearing of headscarves was opposed as a sign of religious 
assertiveness, creating a division between the Muslims and non-Muslims in 
public schools, and therefore not conforming to the secular tradition of 
education. By 1994, popular opinion polls showed that 86 percent of the 
French population was opposed to the wearing of scarves in schools.12 
Whereas some regarded Muslim headscarves as a symbol of oppression of 
women, others were more concerned with the religious affinity, and 
regarded this rising urge of school girls to wear scarves as a political 
statement in sympathy with the Islamic fundamentalist movement, which 
was then challenging Algeria’s military-backed government.13 The latter 
was also related with the fear that politicization of Islamic groups would 
obstruct the integration of about five million Muslims, which is the greatest 
number in European countries.  
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 AlSayyad, Nezar. “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity 
and Culture.” 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
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 As the schools, in accordance to the Bayrou directive, began to 
prevent students who refused to remove their scarves from attending the 
classes, demonstrations and student strikes were done for supporting the 
students and families opposing the directive. Some criticized the ban as 
discriminatory, because it still allowed for religious symbols such as 
crucifixes and Stars of David to be carried by students. Some argued that the 
ban would not encourage integration, but on the contrary, would lead the 
Muslim girls out of the education system. The French Constitutional 
Council ruled in October 1996 that even the Education Ministry had banned 
“ostentatious religious signs”, schools may not suspend pupils who don 
scarves if no overt religious proselytizing is involved.14
 Fifteen years after the Creil affair, on 10 February 2004, the French 
parliamentarians voted for introducing legislation formally barring students 
from wearing “ostentatious” religious symbols in public schools. While 494 
parliamentarians voted in favor of the ban, 36 parliamentarians from the 
Green and Communist parties opposed the legislation, which they said 
discriminated against Muslims.15 The ban passed by the National Assembly 
in March and went into effect in September, and did only affect the public 
schools. The main passage of the bill says: “In primary and secondary state 
schools, wearing signs and clothes that conspicuously display the pupil’s 
religious affiliation is forbidden.”16 In an opinion survey made in late 
                                                 
14 “Rejecting their ancestors the Gauls.” The Economist 16 November 1996. 28 
February 2005 
<http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=9611198063> 
15 “French Parliament votes for Headscarf ban in schools.” Deutsche Welle 10 
February 2004. 11 May 2005. <http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1111321,00.html>. 
16 Heneghan, Tom. “Last-Minute Doubts as French Debate Veils in School.” 
Reuters 3 February 2004. 29 Mart 2005. Accessed through the SikhNetwork. 
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January 2004 by newspaper Liberation, 58 per cent of the respondents said 
that a law banning religious signs was “applicable” in France. 17  
Amid all the controversies and with the support of the majority of 
French society, the public schools began to refuse girls who insist to wear 
their headscarves to attend the classes as the new school year began in 
September 2004. The Muslim girls who did not take off their scarves did not 
have much option in France: among the few schools they can attend is the 
only approved Muslim high school in France as of 2004 (near Lille) Lycee 
Averroes, and there are private Catholic schools which accept girls with 
Muslim headscarves. The Muslim organizations began to develop projects 
in order to canvass money and support the education of expelled girls either 
through correspondence courses or opening private schools.18 According to 
the Education Ministry’s inspector general, Hanifa Cherifi, who was 
appointed in 1994 to mediate between teaching bodies and students wearing 
headscarves and their families, only 48 students had been expelled from 
schools while almost six hundred had agreed to uncover their head. 
However, the activists of the Union of French Islamic Organizations (UOIF) 
which runs a telephone hotline to advice schoolgirls counted at least 806 
“victims of law” who either dropped out or pressured to uncover their hair.19
As the ban of “conspicuous signs of religious affinity” is still a 
matter of controversy in France, from different feminist groups to human 
                                                                                                                            
<http://www.sikhnet.com/Sikhnet/news.nsf/0/B80518ADEA3E927D87256E2F0068A1C5?
openDocument>. 
17 Taber, Kimberly Conniff. “Isolation Awaits French Girls in Headscarves.” 
Women’s E-News 5 March 2004. 13 July 2004. 
<http://www.feminist.com/news/vaw12.html>. 
18 Heneghan, Tom. “French veil ban prompts Muslims to open separate schools.” 
Daily Times 31 March 2005. 12 May 2005. 
<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_31-3-2005_pg4_11>. 
19 Ibid.  
 13
rights organizations and Muslim organizations, the consequences of the ban 
either on the students or on the integration of the Muslim population are also 
the matters which are continuing to be discussed.  
Germany 
 In other European countries, the Muslims wearing headscarves in 
schools did not attain as much public controversy as in France, not to a 
degree to be considered as such a matter of threat to the separation between 
the state and religion. While Denmark and Greece allow students and 
teachers to wear headscarves in schools, in the Netherlands it can be banned 
only if schools are able to cite security risks, and in Belgium the decision is 
largely left to individual schools where a few have imposed a ban.20  
In Germany, however, the issue has been primarily about the 
teachers. A German of Afghan origin, Fereshta Ludin’s legal demands to 
become a teacher has lasted more than five years. In 1998, the board of 
education in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg rejected Ludin’s 
application to become a teacher on the grounds that her headscarf was a 
symbol of the Islamic faith.21 Ludin from the city of Stuttgart has appealed 
first to the municipal, and then to the state courts, which cases she all lost. 
In 2002, the German Federal Administrative Court in Berlin ruled that 
teachers at public school must refrain from openly displaying religious 
symbols in class, since they are representatives of the state. The judges 
overruled Ludin’s private religious rights in favor of that of students’ right 
to secular education; citing the so-called “negative freedom of religion” act, 
which states that students must not be confronted with religious symbols 
                                                 
20 “To ban or not to ban.” The Economist 25 October 2003. 15 May 2005. 
Academic Search Premier 
<http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=11203886>. 
21 “Court says headscarf is religious symbol.” Deutsche Welle 10 October 2002. 12 
May 2005. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,587759,00.html>. 
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against their own will.22 In September 2003, the Federal Constitutional 
Court, the highest court in Germany, overturned this ruling, stating that 
Stuttgart school authorities were wrong to bar Ludin from a teaching job 
because she insisted on wearing her headscarf in the classroom.23 This 
ruling, however, was not based on the idea that a teacher’s wearing 
headscarf in class was constitutionally sound. Although the highest court 
ruled in favor of Ludin, this has been because, the court argued; there was 
no legal ban in place in the state of Baden-Württemberg which supports the 
decision of the school governors. The court further stated that if the German 
states did not want to employ teachers wearing a headscarf, then they would 
first need to create unambiguous laws that expressly ban religious symbols 
in the classroom.24 This ruling and the justification sparkled a controversy in 
Germany, where the states’ education ministers began to issue statements 
saying they plan to enact legislation forbidding state officers, including 
teachers, to wear headscarves. In such a statement, the Education Minister 
of Hessen, Karin Wolff of the Christian Democratic Union party said: “Our 
constitution is based on a Christian-occidental tradition and portrays a value 
system, which the teachers have to follow.”25 Like the Education Minister of 
Baden-Wüttemberg, she declared that the state parliament would begin to 
draw up legislation to ban headscarves in the classroom. So, the ruling of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court in Ludin’s case was far from being 
decisive, on the contrary it initiated a controversy on the need to create a 
legal basis for banning Muslim teachers from wearing headscarves. While 
                                                 
22 Ibid.  
23 “High court rules headscarves okay for teachers.” Deutsche Welle 24 September 
2003. 12 May 2005. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,978043,00.html>. 
24 Ibid. 
25 “German States Move to Enact Headscarf Bans.” Deutsche Welle 25 September 
2003. 21 September 2004. <http://www.dw-
world.de/english/0,1594,1432_A_978888,00.html>. 
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the initiations of the states were also protested, there was a continuing 
discussion as to the limits of what would be perceived as “religious 
symbols” that would violate the neutrality of the state.   
The state government of Baden-Würtemberg enacted a law 
forbidding headscarves in schools in April 2004, and this has terminated 
Ludin’s demand to be a teacher while continuing to wear her headscarf, in 
this state. After Baden-Würtemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Saarland and Lower 
Saxony, the Berlin city-state became the sixth state to enact similar 
legislation banning religious symbols in 2004.26 The municipal lawmakers 
of Berlin adopted a legislation which forbids city employees, including 
school teachers, police officers, court officers, and other civil servants to 
wear Muslim headscarves, Christian crosses, Jewish skullcaps, and Sikh 
turbans.27 However, as the high courts decide on the constitutionality of 
these legislations, the debate whether these legislations aim only the Muslim 
teachers wearing headscarves, or whether a common ground for limiting 
religious symbols would be find, seems to last for some time. In October 
2004, for example, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the law that 
has passed in state Baden-Würtemberg was unfair because it only applied to 
Muslim women yet permitted Christian symbols. It was stated that 
“exceptions for certain forms of religiously motivated clothing was out of 
question”, and hence the legislation would affect the nuns working in the 
public schools as well.28 In supporting the state legislation, the author of the 
legislation, law professor Ferdinand Kirchhof told the magazine Der Spiegel 
that nuns’ habits were considered to be “professional uniforms” in the 
                                                 
26 “Berlin city bans headscarves.” Expatica, News source: dpa.  31 March 2004. 12 
May 2005. 
<http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id=6177>. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Court: Headscarf ban applies to nuns.” Deutsche Welle 10 October 2004. 12 
May 2005. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1355371,00.html>.  
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Roman Catholic Black Forest region of the state, and thus exempt from 
religious symbols law.29
These brief trajectories all tell stories of different tensions and 
vulnerabilities in regard to religious experiences and the relations with the 
minority populations in Europe. The previous experiences of colonialism 
and immigration, the diversity of populations, the discourses of integration 
together influence the terms of the controversies around the wearing of 
headscarf. Arrival at a point of discussing whether to ban or not to ban 
headscarves, and questioning which type of scarves these legislations would 
ban does not substantiate a sound ground for making sense of these 
controversies. Furthermore, this formulation forces one to make a choice, 
for or against the wearing of headscarves. The possible answers to the 
question whether to ban or not to ban, and to the relevant questions that can 
be derived from it, such as whether wearing headscarf is an indication of a 
suppressive religious experience, whether wearing headscarf is only a 
religious obligation or a political statement, they all postulate preestablished 
terms, simplifying the controversy to a matter of choice. I propose that in 
order to analyze the terms through which the various answers are being 
justified, we need to look at how the wearing of headscarf came to be 
constructed as a problem. In this way, I unbind myself from the presumed 
obligation of providing a premature solution disguised as an answer to this 
question. Instead of taking this question into consideration, I rather intend to 
problematize the question and the debate. 
The Construction of Headscarf as a Problem 
As it would be misleading to take the headscarf debate as 
symbolizing the various cultural and political tensions about the Muslim 
populations in European countries, it would be similarly misleading to 
separate this debate and making it an object of independent analysis without 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
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considering the relevant tensions. In Britain, for instance, the Salman 
Rushdie affair had created more overweighing tensions than the headscarf 
debate. When British Muslims petitioned their government to ban Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988, they discovered that the existing 
blasphemy law was confined to Christianity and did not prohibit insults to 
the prophet Muhammad and their demand was rejected.30 The 
demonstrations and protests of the Muslims created a controversy on the 
limits and the tolerance of free speech, a controversy which turned into an 
international event with the fatwa (a religious decree) of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the then Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, through which 
he condemned Salman Rushdie to death and called for his execution for 
insulting Islam in Satanic Verses. Especially but not exclusively in Britain, 
the Rushdie affair came to signify the doubts on Islam’s compatibility with 
Western liberalism while, in effect, it was a part of the larger questioning of 
a society that many Muslims believed did not seem to live up religiously 
and politically to its own standards.31
The construction of headscarf as a problem points not to the various 
solutions adopted or discussed in European countries, but to the emergence 
of the possibility of questioning the headscarf. In other words, in order to 
contextualize the associations of and responses to headscarf in European 
countries, we need to ask why, in the first place, it has emerged as a 
problem. So, what are the dynamics that made possible a principal to expel 
students for coming to school wearing headscarves, well, in the first place to 
make it a matter of decision, or a board of education to reject an application 
                                                 
30 van der Veer, Peter. “The Moral State: Religion, Nation, and Empire in 
Victorian Britain and British India.” Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and 
Asia. Eds. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1999. p. 15.  
31 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. pp. 249-51. 
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for being a teacher? What are the tensions that made such events a matter of 
popular controversy? What are the discourses that made possible to 
formulate the wearing of headscarf as a problem? And, how does a form of 
dress come to arouse so much symbolic meanings and threat?  
As well as the attitudes adopted toward the headscarf issue varies 
from one country to another, the problematizations of the wearing of 
headscarf manifest differences. However, in asking these questions, my aim 
is not to make sense of the debate, not to strip it in order to analyze its 
constituent disputes, not to deconstruct, but to show that it is an outcome of 
growing sensibilities and anxieties. Instead of taking for granted the 
emergence of the debate in Europe as a result of growing number of 
Muslims and their demands, I would like to remind that headscarf was a 
form of clothing before it became to bear various symbolic meanings.  So, 
considering all various types of headscarves, including the attires, veils and 
hijabs as forms of clothing, like any other ordinary part of clothing; like 
suits, Saris, Jewish caps or pants which might have regional, cultural and 
religious connotations, it demands a process though which a clothing which 
has existed in Europe began to symbolize a religious affinity, in uniformity. 
Not only headscarf began to be considered generally as a homogeneous type 
of dressing, it came to be exclusively identified with the religious practice of 
Islam. So, it would not appear natural from this perspective that a form of 
clothing can be interpreted as threatening the secularity, and the neutrality 
of a state. In other words, it would have been absurd for a person living in 
late nineteenth century’s liberalizing France, for example, to imagine 
opposing a conservative form of dress, which was common in many parts of 
the religious rural hinterlands.32
                                                 
32 AlSayyad, Nezar. “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity 
and Culture.” Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age 
of Globalization. Eds. Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells. Berkeley: Lexington Books, 
2002. p. 15.  
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Of course every type of clothing has cultural and sometimes political 
connotations in different societies, in specific historical contexts. In 
suggesting to focus on the problematic33 of the debate methodologically, I 
do not intend to simplify or neglect the present connotations of headscarf or 
veil. Nor do I imply that headscarf has not been ab/used as a political 
statement by both parties; those who are against it or who support it. On the 
contrary, my intention is to develop a distanced point of view to this debate 
in order to contextualize it, which together with the Rushdie affair has made 
public the topic and the problem of Muslim presence in Europe. It is the 
moment when wearing of headscarf could be constructed as a problem that 
it could become a statement. In its various forms the headscarf has for so 
many years came to bear various political significations in societies where 
the Muslims are in majority, especially in Turkey, Algeria, Iran; where the 
removal of it at a time meant a convincing step towards modernization, 
whereas the assertion of which came to state resistance and emancipation 
under imperialist threat or colonialist rule, for instance.  
                                                 
33 See, for a conception of “problematic, or problematization” the interview 
“Polemics, Politics and Problemizations” with Michel Foucault in The Foucault Reader: An 
Introduction to Foucault’s Thought. Paul Rabinow, ed. London: Penguin, 1991, (1984). 
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2 – “The Muslim Presence in Europe” 
At a time when the headscarf began to be problematized in European 
countries, as this problem came to be regarded together with various 
tensions from integration to tolerance of free speech, a new area of 
sociological inquiry began to take shape. From the previous studies of social 
conflicts between immigrants and host societies, focusing on racism and 
identity politics, a new area began to confine itself to Muslim populations 
and the relevant issues of their integration, to the ways they form 
communities and to the interaction between Muslim communities and host 
societies. For a clue on the emergence of this area, it would suffice to have a 
look at the headings of conferences and the subsequent publications 
reaching a pace in the past fifteen years on this subject in the universities in 
Europe and USA. The previous approaches and the terminology of the 
studies examining the conditions and struggles of immigrants after de-
colonization were considered insufficient to account for the conflicts 
between Muslim populations and host societies in European countries. And 
hence the title “the Muslim presence in Europe” came to group these issues 
on a new ground, the issues which the terms like “guestworkers” or “ex-
colonizeds” fall short to account for.  
Although the study of Muslims and Islam within Europe during the 
60’s and 70’s was primarily concentrating on the analysis of migration, after 
the 80’s it was pursued in diverse contextual analysis, emphasizing the 
cultural dimension. On the one hand, the evolution of the study of Islam and 
Muslims in Europe was the consequence of local and global political 
changes, such as the growing demands of Muslims in Western Europe, the 
Iranian Revolution, the politicization of Islam in the Arab world. But on the 
other hand, this growing interest also coincides with the increasing critique 
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of social sciences within the Western academia, with the tendency to 
deconstruct social science paradigms through the advent of the cultural.34
The title “The Muslim presence in Europe” came to signify the 
Muslim populations in European countries as a group, whose relations with 
their host societies could be assessed in comparison, and thus forming a new 
field of inquiry. The previous studies on the dynamics of how immigrants 
cope with their new environments, on the obstacles and possible solutions to 
their integration were in general undertaken by studies which focus on the 
tensions growing around the Muslim populations. As European countries 
grew multiethnic more than ever, regardless of their cultural and religious 
differences the Muslims in Europe were observed as one of the biggest and 
most agitated group. Accordingly, the headscarf debate belongs to a 
background of tensions emerging as the growing numbers of Muslim 
populations through acquiring residency or citizenship have become 
permanent and visible. This background is underlined with the question of 
Islam’s becoming a grave source of concern in Europe, awaking old fears 
and hostilities against Islam on a new scheme. 
The Negative Perceptions of Islam 
“The Muslim presence in Europe” signifies the turmoil echoing back 
in Europe of the growing tensions and fears of the resurgence of Islam, as 
called “the politicization of Islam” in the Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries. This turmoil in Europe is generated by the demands of Muslim 
populations to participate equally in their societies while retaining their 
                                                 
34 Zemni, Sami. “Islam, European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism.” 
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cultural and religious identities. On the other side, it reflects the 
revitalization of the sentiments against Islam now feared to invade Europe 
from inside. This turmoil was furnished in Europe with occurrences such as 
the Rushdie affair in Britain and the headscarf affair in France and more 
recently flared after September 11, 2001, the terrorist attack to the World 
Trade Center in New York, and the bombings in Madrid and London. 
However, drastic international developments, such as the Iranian 
Revolution, the Gulf Wars, the electoral success of the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) in Algeria in 1991, which was followed by civil war, the 
revolution in Afghanistan, all incited this turmoil to a very significant 
degree. Hence it is proposed here that the designation of “Muslims in 
Europe” coincides with the growing debate of “Islamic fundamentalism” 
which founded a base to the prevailing rhetoric of antagonism between 
“Western World” and “Islamic World” to which Muslims in Europe 
supposedly belong to.  
In spite of the diversity of the centuries-long interactions, the present 
perceptions of Islam in Europe has pertained the ancient stereotypical 
images and sentiments dating back to Arab conquests, the Crusades and the 
expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, for many Muslims and Arabs 
in the Middle Eastern and Asian countries, the legacy of Western 
colonialism and imperialism not only resides in the memories, but together 
with the recent US interventions, provides an easy scapegoat for the 
regional failures and discomforts, as they see a Western threat which is not 
only political or economical, but also cultural.35 Addressing to age-old fears 
and taking shelter in monolithic stereotypes in times of conflict, opting for 
populist slogans demonizing the other is definitely not confined to any 
society or religion. The rhetoric of Christian-Islam rivalry has produced 
                                                 
35 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. p. 217. 
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dogmatic perceptions of one another when accented with mutual ignorance 
and stereotyping.  
The perception of Islam in Europe, from the statements of politicians 
and experts to the presentations in the media, is dominated by the negative 
images which foster the view of Islam as a threat.36 This negative perception 
is infected with tendencies of falsely grounding the agitated political 
relations between the countries of the West and the Middle East 
simplistically on a difference of religion, and sometimes on a difference of 
civilization. Hence the economical and political conflicts are explained 
solely in terms of religion, or civilization, in which case “West” means the 
legacy of modern and secular democracy. On the other hand, when it comes 
to the “Muslim World”, the prevalent inclination is to reduce the diverse 
religious practices of different peoples to a monolithical, abstract and static 
conception of Islam. From this point of view, it appears as though the 
religious experiences and doctrines of Islam are fixed and similar 
everywhere around the world where Muslims are living. This monolithical 
and fixed conception of Islam is symptomatic of the rhetoric of antagonism 
between Western and Muslim worlds, in which the analyses are based on 
Western-centered points of reference. In fact, such comparative approaches 
between these two invented worlds “are prone to comparing a religion 
(Islam) with a region (or society) (the west).”37 Another grave tendency is to 
confuse Islam with the political movements and organizations which either 
                                                 
36 For an analysis of media presentations of Islam in Western countries, see Said, 
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37 Shadid, Wasif and Sjoerd van Koningsveld. “The Negative Image of Islam and 
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draw their strength from or legitimize their actions through Islamic 
doctrines. Here again, especially in the last thirty years, the political events 
in countries where the Muslims are in majority, the emerging Islamic parties 
and organizations, and the growing tendency of political leaders to appeal to 
religious sentiments of their people are all conceived as the signs of 
politicization of Islam. Furthermore, the electoral successes of Islamic 
parties in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Gaza, Turkey and Kuwait have 
provided major examples.   
In their article on the negative image of Islam and Muslims in the 
West, W. Shadid and S. van Koningsveld categorize this attitude under five 
models: 1) of changing power relationship; 2) of the clash of civilizations; 
3) of political Islam; 4) of oversimplified information; and 5) of increased 
Muslim immigration to the Western World.38 However, I propose that these 
models are most of the time overlapping. Aside from the general tendency 
to conceive Islam as a threat, those who advocate that there would be a clash 
of civilizations tend to refer to the changing power relationship, for 
example, and those who point to the growing number of Muslim immigrants 
in Europe (and in the West) generally warn against the political Islam. It is a 
fact that Muslim immigrants in European countries reached a considerable 
number after the 80’s, but the process through which they began to be 
considered as representative or an extension of the “Muslim World” is the 
crucial point. On the other hand, the political parties and organizations 
which base their views on Islamic doctrines began to find popular support 
and widened their activities in countries where Muslims are in majority. But 
how this myth of Islamic threat is generated from the relationship between 
the Western and Middle Eastern countries needs to be analyzed. Hence, 
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instead of making a projection on these models separately, in order to 
understand the dynamics of political Islam and the claim of Islamic threat, 
the following section will try to sketch out the political events in the Middle 
East which inaugurated an interest in Islam and Muslims in the West.  
The Political Islam and the Rhetoric of Antagonistic Worlds  
Especially recent extremist activities executed by radical Islamists in 
the Western countries endorsed supporters of the views that in the post-cold 
war era a new clash in the world would not be at the level of nation-states, 
but between civilizations of the West and East (Islam and Chinese)39; and 
that Muslims are in rage against the West40. These views support the general 
idea or sentiment that Islam is a threat, not only politically or culturally, but 
now demographically in Europe as well. However, failing to separate the 
violent and non-violent movements, and addressing to a general “rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism,” these general presentations of Islam and Islamic 
movements as threats present a myopic focus. They fall short of taking into 
account the conditions under which various Islamic movements emerged. 
Moreover, they provide a monolithic perception of these movements, 
occasionally leading to identify religiously oriented movements with 
fundamentalism and fundamentalism with terrorism.41 The term 
“fundamentalism” which is exclusively identified with Islamic movements, 
is dubious in its use. Although it is derived from early twentieth century 
American evangelicalism, it is taken as an analytic term, interpreted as a 
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social force directed against modernity.42 In attributing the emergence of 
Islamic political movements mainly to Islam as a religion, these ethno-
centrist views completely neglect the influence of the social, economic, 
political and cultural conditions in the region.43 Furthermore, those who 
support the idea that the new clash would be between civilizations rather 
than economical blocks of nation-states are adopting an essentialistic 
conception of civilization –dividing the world into the west and the rest and 
reducing the dimensions of the conflicts to supposed intrinsic qualities of 
these two asserted civilizational poles.  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the experiences and 
reformations have shaped the societies in the Middle East and Asia, their 
relations with the world, their struggles against imperialism, the formations 
of new countries and the successive reformations. Although each of these 
countries has its own peculiar history of modernization and reformation in 
its struggle for political and economical independence, the transformation of 
the place of religion in each society has also shaped its peculiar history. The 
term “Islamic revivalism” signifies the resurgence of Muslim politics in 
both personal and public life as a reflexive reply to the experiences of crisis 
and failure, having its origins in late sixties and early seventies. Various 
events have drawn the attention to a phenomenon called “politicization of 
Islam” when “Islam reemerged as a potent global force in Muslim politics 
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during the 1970s and 1980s.”44 During the seventies, the heads of states and 
opposition movements in the Middle East appealed to Islam to enhance their 
legitimacy while Islamic organizations and institutions proliferated. Some 
drastic events, such as the Egyptian-Israeli war, the Arab oil embargo of 
1973, the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 all evidenced the power of 
resurgence of Islam threatening Western interests.45 Especially the Iranian 
Revolution and the transformation of the Revolution to an Islamic Republic 
had a tremendous effect. Apart from the statements of the ruling ayatollahs 
expressing their willingness to export the revolution, the revolution 
influencing many Islamic activists throughout the world as an example of a 
modern Islamic revolution had changed the regional politics and the 
perceptions towards Islamic movements as well. The Iranian Revolution had 
a shocking effect not only on Western countries but also on the regional 
politics, both internationally and intranationally. USA was considering the 
Shah governed state as its most stable ally in the region. The Shii minority 
communities in Sunni dominated states like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
aggressively asserted their identity and rights by expressing at most times 
outrageously their discontent with ruling regimes.46 The furious unrest in the 
region caused by the development of Shii militant organizations and the 
upheaval of Sunni activists are all direct impacts of the revolution. The eight 
year long Iran-Iraq war, which started when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, 
inflamed the relations between Iran and other states. Iran was not only 
suspected of exporting the revolution, but more directly of the bombings of 
Western embassies, car bomb attacks and taking of hostages. During this 
period, the governmental use of Islamic doctrines by political leaders in the 
Middle East and Asia had also played a great role in the perception of Islam 
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in the West: Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, Sudan’s Gaafar Muhammad 
Nimeiri, Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, Pakistan’s Zia 
ul-Haq, Bangladesh’s Muhammad Ershad, Malaysia’s Muhammad 
Mahathir.47
In societies where the majority is Muslims48, the scale of Islamic 
revivalism has changed magnitude in the nineties through a new class of 
modern-educated and Islamically oriented elites who work alongside with 
their secular counterparts.49 A new generation of Islamically oriented 
political leaders have not only appeared in Muslim countries, but Islamically 
oriented political parties gained considerable strength in secular states as 
well. A new transformation of society began to take place; religiously 
oriented non-governmental organizations which extend to education, 
investment and social services emerged. Hence the term “Islamic 
revivalism” does not refer exclusively to the actions of the extremist Islamic 
organizations or to political leaders appealing to the religious sentiments of 
the population, but rather to a multifaceted socioreligious movement which 
functions in virtually every country where Muslims are in majority, and 
transnationally.50  
However, the negative perception of Islam in the West does not 
depend on some critical analysis of the regional politics or of new 
sociological movements, but it was shaped by drastic occurrences. When 
The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had swept municipal and later national 
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parliamentary elections in Algeria, it created tidal shocks in the 
governments in the region creating a dreadful anxiety and it astonished 
experts and policymakers who expected least of a Francophone country to 
opt for a political party which proposes an Islamic solution. In 1990, Algeria 
had its first municipal elections since independence, out of which the FIS 
won the control of 55 percent of the municipal councils and two thirds of 
the regional assemblies in contrast to the governing party of the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) who won only 32 percent of the municipal and 29 
percent of the regional elections.51 In December next year, Algeria held the 
first multiparty parliamentary elections in its thirty-year history. The FIS 
had overwhelmingly ensured its place in the first round, in the course of 
democratic parliamentary system. While the Islamists celebrated the 
outcome of the parliamentary election as a vindication of the representative 
nature of their movements, the opponents accused the FIS for using the 
democratic process simply to come to power in order to impose an Islamic 
system of government.52 The following military coup to prevent the FIS 
from coming to government led Algeria to a severe civil war, exemplifying 
for many rulers in the region the most unimaginable breakdown of 
parliamentary system if and when they let loose the ropes.  
Another such drastic incident was the Gulf War of 1991, in which 
Iraq invaded Kuwait. Contrary to the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam Hussein failed 
to gather regional support, but divided the Arab world despite his fruitless 
attempts to mobilize populist Muslim opinion, against his previous 
appearance of an un-Islamic, secular leader. “Like the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
Saddam appealed to Islam to enhance his image as the champion of the 
Palestinians, of the poor and oppressed, and the liberator of the holy places, 
as well as to legitimize his call for a holy war against Western (especially 
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U.S.) occupation of Arab lands and control of Arab oil.”53 As Khomeini 
threatened to export revolution, Saddam’s call for waging a holy war against 
the Western “Crusaders” ratified the fears of a militant Islam raging war 
against the West.  
Alongside these unexpected and drastic events, media images of 
Qaddafi, Khomeini and Saddam as the archaic despots and of the atrocities 
of the extremist groups all reinforced the perception of Islam as intolerant; 
to democracy, liberties, pluralism, and modernity. Furthermore, the 
experiences of parliamentary democracy in the Middle Eastern countries 
evidenced the conflicts between military backed authoritarian governments 
and parties or groups who demand political liberalization and social reform. 
During the eighties and nineties, the Islamic political parties proved that 
they could appeal to the demand of change and reform when permitted. The 
autocratic rulers and governments suppressed the Islamic movements and 
obstructed their political participation, opting for stability to democracy, 
using the fear of “Muslim fundamentalism” as an excuse. “The claim that 
both Arab culture and Islam are antidemocratic and the fear that Islamists 
will use the electoral process to seize power have been used to rationalize 
lack of enthusiasm or support for political liberalization in the Middle 
East.”54  The political instability in the region, the governments’ efforts to 
suppress the opposition, especially using the “threat of Islamic radicalism” 
at the stake of suppressing the demands of political liberalization have 
supported the view that Islam is not compatible with democracy.  
The view that Islam is not compatible with democracy has been 
asserted by various actors for different reasons. There are Muslims and 
leaders of Islamic movements who are against democracy and parliamentary 
system of government, who either conceive democracy as a part of Western 
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influence or as totally incompatible with Islam. And there are others who 
suggest that Muslims should generate their own forms of political 
participation from within the doctrines of Islam. On the other hand, for the 
leaders in the West, democracy in the Middle East means “more 
independent and less predictable nations which might make Western access 
to oil less secure.”55 The view that Islam is inherently antidemocratic 
inevitably supports the presentation of Islam as a threat, which eventually is 
used to support the rhetoric of West-Muslim Worlds’ rivalry.   
The monolithical representations of the relations between societies 
of different religions, the view that Islam is a threat, and that it is not 
compatible with democracy are avowed in conforming the polarization 
which is suggested to replace the cold war polarization. On the other hand, 
however, the construction of a polarization between the West and Islam had 
not emerged from one direction only, it was voiced to conceal the interests 
of those who voiced it; Khomeini and Saddam Hussein made plenty use of 
this rhetoric, so did the political leaders of the Western countries.  
Given the residual conflicts and confrontations between the Western 
countries and the countries where Muslims are in majority, and given the 
significant presence and growth of the Muslim communities in the European 
countries, the perception of Islam as a threat is now observed as a domestic 
threat. It is feared that fundamentalism would spread to the Muslim 
communities in Europe, especially stimulated by the rise of “politicization 
of Islam” in Algeria and Turkey, without taking into consideration the 
specific histories of these countries, and without a sound distinction between 
Islam and fundamentalism or between violent and nonviolent activism. The 
West European countries, especially Britain, France and Germany had 
experienced waves of immigrants from their ex-colonies and from East 
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European countries. The issues of integration, problems of racism and 
xenophobia are not new. “However, the presence of significant Muslim 
minority populations puts strains on the social fabric of European societies 
like France, where Islam is the second largest religion, Germany, and Great 
Britain, where it is in third place. Anti-Arab/Muslim sentiment in Western 
Europe is part of a growing combination of Islamophobia and xenophobia. 
Muslim communities and indigenous groups have clashed over questions of 
continued immigration, citizenship and the accommodation of Muslim 
belief and practice.”56
The Formation of European Identity 
In contextualizing the emergence of the headscarf debate in France, 
and some years before that, the Rushdie affair in Britain, one witnesses how 
the growing debates came to circulate overwhelmingly around cultural 
terms rather than referring to economic and social factors relevant to the 
integration of religious minorities. In addressing to the upheaval of 
Maghribi Muslims in France, their social and economic circumscription is 
one of the least mentioned elements in a country where Muslim religion “is 
the religion of the poor.”57 Whereas in Britain, the anti-discrimination laws 
legislated to relieve racism fail to recognize discriminatory acts based on 
religious affinities of Muslims. The Asian Muslims here are among the most 
underrepresented and disadvantaged groups.58 In European countries, 
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Muslim minorities and their demands began to be assessed through the 
supposed antagonism between modernity and Islam: where the headscarf is 
considered as a threat to the secular tradition of education in France, the 
demand of Muslim groups in Britain to ban the publication of Satanic 
Verses has been regarded as an intolerance to the freedom of speech. In both 
cases, the origin of conflict was considered as an incompatibility of Islamic 
doctrines with the values of modernity; secularization, freedom of speech, 
and tolerance. In these two incidences, not only the right-wing and the 
conservatives, but the liberals, socialists and laics have voiced their 
concerns. Hence the emergence of the title “Muslim presence in Europe” 
coincides with the attention drawn to Islam, which came to be phrased as 
“the problem of Islam in Europe”.  
Now there is a sense in which “the presence of Muslims in Europe”, 
with “the problem of Islam”, is in a significant way a matter of how 
Europeans perceive themselves, or, in other words, how European identity is 
conceived. In most simple terms, the question of how religious minorities in 
Europe can adapt to their societies turns into the question of what would be 
the feature of Europe if and when they adapt, and more importantly, to what 
are they expected to adapt? Some social scientists studying the Muslim 
minorities in Europe suggest that “a European recognition of the 
permanence of the Muslim presence comes a challenge to European self-
understanding.”59 But the question is: What is the European self-
understanding? Is there such an attainable European self-understanding, or 
rather, is it continually being constructed? Furthermore, the perception of 
such a challenge is inevitably related to how the Muslim presence in Europe 
is recognized. The previous section sketched the dynamics through which 
the recognition of Muslim presence in Europe has been conditioned by the 
negative perceptions of Islam in Europe. This section, however, will try to 
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discuss how this recognition is related to the growing concern of European 
identity. In this respect, it is proposed that the problem of Muslim presence 
is an integral part of the formation of a European identity.60
According to Talal Asad, the site of the discourse of identity in 
Europe is suppressed fear:  
“The idea of European identity, I say, is not merely a matter 
of how legal rights and obligations can be reformulated. Nor is it 
simply a matter of how a more inclusive name can be made to claim 
loyalties that are attached to national or local ones. It concerns 
exclusions and the desire that those excluded recognize what is 
included in the name one has chosen for oneself. The discourse of 
European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans.”61
 The issue of “European identity” began to be posed as a problem during the 
sixties, together with a recent attention drawn to “identity.”62 In fact, the 
idea of “identity” as something depending on other’s recognition of self, 
rather than signifying “sameness” is quite recent and the preoccupation with 
this idea in social sciences dates from after the Second World War.63 This 
new sense of “identity” defines itself on the differences drawn from a 
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constructed “other”, difference here understood as the opposite of sameness. 
But in order to be recognized, there must be an “other”; in other words, the 
recognition of an “other” is an integral part of constructing an identity 
through difference.  
In identity formation, it might be claimed that Muslims are the 
“other” of Europeans; the difference from whom the identity of Europe is 
defined negatively. It seems plausible to suggest that as culturally the most 
distinctive and presumably as the most difficult of the immigrant 
populations to be absorbed, the Muslims in Europe “have become the new 
“other” of Europe, replacing the Jews of an earlier era, and the communists 
of more recent times.”64 Furthermore, it is also possible to historicize the 
influence of Muslims in the formation of Europe: “Europe was made by the 
encounter with and resistance to other religions –specifically the Muslim 
religion. It was largely in response to the Muslim threat –from Mongols and 
Tatars in the north, Arabs and Turks in the south– that Europe drew 
together.”65  
If one fails to recognize the irony in suggesting that the Muslims are 
the new “other” of Europeans, one would fail to recognize the ironies in the 
assertions of identities constructed on “a constructed other”. It would, then, 
lead to considering the Jews as the natural alien and Muslim immigrants 
now as the natural other, discarding how the dynamics of othering were/are 
conducted. In other words, if one takes this statement literally, one would 
mock the brutal history in which Jews were eliminated, and more recently, 
the tragedies in the Bosnia and Kosova wars. Hence, against such a line of 
thinking, I suggest that there are two traps in which one can be caught when 
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proposing that Muslim immigrants are the new “other” of Europeans. The 
first one is to stabilize the “other” in its essentiality, which would lead to 
essentialize the “self” as well. The second is to historicize the antagonism of 
“self” and “other”.  
In regards to the first trap, the practice and aspects of Islam are not 
acknowledged in their own right, but approached negatively, defined with a 
lack in relation to European civilizational attributions. Hence, “Islam” lacks 
tolerance, freedom of expression, democracy, respect for the individual; it is 
de-essentialized in order to be re-essentialized as an alter realm of 
antagonism. As in the procedure in which the headscarf loses its historical 
and cultural meaning and came to signify a hostile and alien “Muslimism”, 
the Muslim immigrants in Europe are re-essentialized in their hostility to 
European civilizational values as the new “other” within. Although the 
Muslim populations in European countries display very diverse cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds, their most significant commonality appears to be 
religion. But here again, from the Pakistanis in Britain to Algerians in 
France, to Turks in Germany, these people display very different 
experiences and understandings of Islam. 
 Historicizing this kind of antagonism, on the other hand, would 
inevitably lead to abrupt anachronisms: it was the Muslims against whom 
the Europeans joined forces during Crusades, or when defending the 
Habsburg Empire. However, these enterprises were not “European”, instead, 
they were Christian. While the antagonism between Europe and Islam 
(“Muslim World”) is historicized, it should be noted that the essential values 
that designate a European civilization are recognized as ahistorical concepts.  
The search for identity yields to constructing new histories: a 
historical narrative of “European (or Western) civilization,” with common 
experiences of Christianity, Enlightenment and industrialization, with 
shared values of democracy, tolerance and human rights. This narrative 
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positions its distinctive character by claiming “universality”: a claim which 
has served as an instrument in reconstructing the world through colonialism 
continues to serve as a criterion to define the “otherness” of the other. A 
narrative, in which the medieval Spain and wars of religion between the 
Christian sects are omitted; a narrative which becomes a mere myth. When a 
discourse of identity is founded on ahistoricized essentialities, the 
perception of a European identity would base itself on one side of 
civilizational antagonism. Moreover, failing to acknowledge the irony in the 
suggestion that the Muslims are the new Jews of Europe would place one in 
the rhetoric of antagonistic worlds: the European world (West) and the 
Muslim world. Rather, the recent quest and questioning of a European 
identity should be considered in relation with the post-war circumstances, 
resonating with the problems faced in the process of European integration. It 
should be noted that although the debate of a European identity has recently 
augmented in relation to the enlargement discussions of European Union, 
this debate has connotations and implications well beyond the turbulences 
on the constitutional and expansional quest of the EU.   
It was during the traumatic years after 1945 when the idea of 
“Europe” was refurbished as a substitute for the national identifications 
which caused so many wounds, and “Europe” had to be reinvented in order 
to be outstripped from the connotations of the new world order defended by 
Nazis and Fascist Right during the interwar decades and during the war.66 
During the construction of a united Europe in the post-war era, the 
uneasiness about the specificity of a European culture and identity increased 
in time, yet it was much less problematic until the sixties.67  
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The collapse of the Soviet system and the formation of new 
countries had acute consequences for defining the boundaries of an 
integrating Europe, both geographically and culturally. Likewise, the 
candidacy of Turkey to EU more recently evoked and continues to raise 
questions in regard to the identity of Europe, the discursive site where 
“Islam” is constructed as Europe’s other. The projections about the eastern 
border cannot be considered solely as geographical or symbolic concerns. 
Hence, as Russia draws the east border, are Poland and Hungary well-
founded in their claim to be in Central Europe? Or, leaving aside various 
obstacles and discussions with respect to the candidacy of Turkey, how 
would Europeans feel to be neighboring with Iran and Iraq, if or when 
Turkey becomes a member state? The symbolic implications about the 
borders of EU is presenting themselves in the discussions of exclusions and 
distancing which in turn defines a European identity. Hence, it is plausible 
to claim that in their positioning to belong to Central Europe, Poles, Czechs 
and Hungarians are distancing themselves from a socialist history.68 Then, it 
is an easy step to argue that Russia has never belonged to European 
civilization; meaning, Russia does not share the same values and assets 
deriving from a shared history, which make up the European civilization. 
The formation of identity through exclusions needs differences as basis and 
the borders serve as fault lines for these differences.  
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It might be suggested that, in fact, there is no single (and fixed) 
“Europe”, in the sense that the European identity is imagined in reflection to 
more than one “other”. The post-war years mainly witnessed a temporal and 
self-reflexive othering when Europe was distancing itself from its own past; 
whereas after the nineties, the geographical and cultural otherings took 
precedence.69 Hence the imagery “other” of Europe harbors its continental 
past, and its colonial past; the East; the “Muslim World”; the rest of the 
West; the United States; Communism; Russia; eastern Europe, etc. 
In the formation of a European identity through difference, the 
Europeans acquire their identities in as much and to the extent that they 
partake of the set of values and properties. Hence, not all Europeans are 
“European” to the same degree; the Russians are on the margins, for 
example, and “Bosnian Muslims may be in Europe but are not of it.”70 Talal 
Asad, in claiming that the problem of understanding Islam in Europe is 
primarily a matter of how “Europe” is conceptualized by Europeans, argues 
that Muslims are present in Europe and yet absent from it.71 Not only 
Muslims are external to the essence of Europe, from the civilization essence 
of European identity, but Islam is excluded from the historical narrative and 
representations of Europe. Hence in order to become European, the Muslims 
in European countries have to divest themselves from their previous 
affinities and traditions and adopt the values which make up the European 
civilization. This expectation from immigrants to adapt in order to integrate 
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to their host societies finds its terminology in the policies of integration 
which seeks a guarantee for the loyalty of immigrants. However, what is at 
work in this expectation is the universal claim of European civilization, 
which is its identification with modernity and progress. Integration becomes 
a process through which immigrants have to prove their loyalty via their 
sameness, to a degree which might in the end bypass differences in physical 
appearances. 
This simplified approach of integration, however, is not any other 
than assimilation. The view that school girls (or teachers) can be forced to 
withdraw their headscarves so that they can adapt to a secular form of 
education is residual of the rhetoric of assimilation, relying on a naïve belief 
that by divesting off her headscarf one can divest her Muslimism. And why 
should she? If one believes that (and many do) wearing a headscarf is a 
means to practice one’s religious faith on a daily life basis, to ban this 
practice is to deny one’s right to religious freedom. Obviously, here, the 
discussions whether such a belief is valid or not, whether it is self-conscious 
or enforced are discarded for the sake of clarity to argue that what is at stake 
here is beyond the personal inclinations and reasons. The visibility of 
religious signs has been a matter of dispute in the history of secularization in 
Europe, and the Muslim signs are recently coming to the scene and 
negotiate with the established solutions. The recognition and tolerance of 
the religious rights of denominations other than the majority have a long 
history in Europe. But here, in the case of headscarf, what is important is 
that the Muslim school girls in France are forced to be self-aware of their 
headscarves because of the debates and finally with the ban. The growing 
number of girls who come up to school with headscarves after the Creil 
affair in France is a good indication for this.  
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3 – The Myth of Headscarf and Secularism 
The prima facie answer to the question how wearing of headscarf 
was constructed as a problem and attained such significance is the growth of 
the number of Muslim people in European countries. This dress code have 
become visible and come to be identified with Muslim populations. One can 
add to that, that the politicization of Islam in countries where Muslims are in 
majority as well as in European countries has aggravated a cultural 
polarization in European societies. It can be stated that through headscarves, 
the Muslim populations, especially Muslim women and their religious 
experiences have become visible in Western Europe. However, all these do 
not explain why and how a dress could be considered as a symbol: of 
radicalization; of oppression of women; of a repressive form of religious 
practice; of a threat to secularism; of Muslim communitarianism; of 
religious assertion; or of an assertion of identity. The number of Muslim 
immigrants or the differences between the practices of Islam and 
Christianity fall short of accounting for the tensions in this controversy.   
A Mythological Reading of Headscarf 
In order to show the dynamics of how headscarf was constructed as 
a problem, I suggest reading it as a myth. The reading of headscarf as a 
myth, as constructed in European countries, would both reveal the way how 
such symbolic connotations could be derived from a dress and in being 
mythified, how the speech of headscarf could become ambiguous. In being 
mythified, the scarf becomes so ambiguous that it is no more possible to 
take it only as a dress nor only as a symbol of a religious or cultural history. 
It becomes impossible just to suggest that it is an ordinary type of dressing 
without arousing other suggestions, nor is it possible to grant its symbolic 
value on its own. And furthermore, considering it only as a symbol is what 
makes the whole debate an impasse. Trying to provide an explanation to an 
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ambiguity would either conceal it or reduce it to one thing: trying to give an 
explanation to an ambiguity is an absurd attempt.  
It is possible to suggest that through headscarves, the Muslim 
women in European societies are stigmatized; the visibility of headscarf is a 
means to stigmatize them.72 Or it can be discussed that the Muslim 
headscarf is used to stereotype Muslim people. However, I rather argue that 
if headscarf was simply a means of a stereotypical presentation of Muslim 
people, it would not be possible to derive so many symbolic meanings from 
it. Stereotypes are the least ambiguous speeches. Instead of being a 
stigmatized symbol, the following analysis will try to prove that the 
headscarf is functioning as a myth. 
 Roland Barthes develops his reading of myth through uniting the 
formal analysis of semiology with an analysis of present ideology. And in 
his theory of mythology, myth is not a concept or idea but a message. As is 
also evident from his collected writings in Mythologies, according to 
Barthes, everything can be a myth, provided that it is conveyed by a 
discourse. Moreover myth can not be defined by its object or material.73 In 
this debate, headscarf as it is regarded in Europe, can be read as a Barthean 
myth: as a second-order sign, where its meaning as a clothing which is 
contained in a religious and cultural history is lost; and its form, is wholly 
absorbed by its concept “Muslimism”.74
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1. Signifier 2. Signified   
3. Sign 
I. SIGNIFIER (meaning as the final 
term of the linguistic system, form as 
the first term on myth plane) 
II. SIGNIFIED 
(concept) 
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III. SIGN (signification) 
 
Although a person’s suit signifies the status or position of its carrier 
in the society, headscarf has become a myth, it has been mythified. 
Following Barthes’ analysis of myth, in the first order, as a sign, the 
headscarf is a cloth worn, signifying a cultural or religious history 
depending on the type of cloth and its style, just like any other clothing. 
However, in the second order which is the order of myth, this meaning 
presents the form (head-scarf-worn) which outdistances the meaning. The 
meaning which contained a whole system of values, a history, a geography, 
a morality is put at a distance by the form. The meaning loses its value, but 
keeps its life, from which the form of the myth will draw its nourishment.75 
In myth, there is a continuous alternation of meaning and the form: they are 
never present at the same place. Because of this continuous play of form and 
meaning, the signifier of the myth is ambiguous. And in accordance with 
Barthes’ different possible ways of reading myth, when the focus is made on 
the empty signifier of the myth (form), headscarf becomes a symbol of 
Muslimism76; the concept fills the form of the myth without any ambiguity. 
Hence the headscarf is read as a symbol of Muslimism, but since it is fixed 
in the form (of headscarf), the religious and cultural connotations will 
evaporate. However, in a second option, when reading it like a mythologist 
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and when focused on the full signifier (meaning), headscarf becomes an 
alibi of Muslimism; the signification of the myth is undone, the form and 
the meaning are distinguished. In this reading, the symbolic load of the 
myth is cancelled; the ambiguity is reduced/concealed through an 
explanation. And finally, when focused on the mythical signifier as a whole, 
there is an ambiguous signification: headscarf becomes the very presence of 
Muslimism. This last reading is of the myth reader who responds to the 
dynamics of the myth.  
This suggested analysis of scarf in Europe as a myth makes possible 
to show why the scarf is not like any other form of dress anymore and also 
why taking it as a symbol is only one way of reading the headscarf. In order 
to respond fully to the ambiguity in this mythical speech, we need to 
advance the reading through taking into account the motivation of this myth 
and then bring together with what is said before about the debate being 
constructed as a problem. Barthes proposes that “in order to gauge the 
political load of an object and the mythical hollow that espouses it, one must 
never look at things from the point of the signification, but from that of the 
signifier, of the thing which has been robbed: and within the signifier, from 
the point of the language-object, that is of the meaning.”77 In other words, 
instead of undoing the signification of the myth as can be done by a 
mythologist, we should rather focus on what happens to the meaning of 
headscarf. In the continuous play of meaning and form, the form does not 
suppress the meaning, but it impoverishes it, puts it at a distance. And the 
history which drains out of the form is wholly absorbed by the concept 
(Muslimism). The concept is determined, both historically and intentionally; 
it is the motivation which causes the myth to be uttered. Hence the relation 
which unites the concept of the myth to its meaning is a relation of 
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deformation; the meaning is distorted by the concept. Through the concept, 
it is a whole new history which is implanted in the myth, and the knowledge 
contained in a mythical concept is confused, made of yielding, shapeless 
associations; hence, the mythical concept is appropriated.78 However, the 
motivation is never “natural”: myth is speech stolen and restored. What is 
restored (Muslimism) is no longer quite that which is stolen (the history of 
scarf). The history of headscarf is distorted by Muslimism. Though the myth 
is read as a factual system, it is a semiological system. 
If myth naturalizes the concept through transforming history into 
nature, what is it that the mythical speech of headscarf naturalizes? Or, here, 
what does it mean when we say that Muslimism is being naturalized? What 
is the history that is drained out of the form and what is the new history 
which is implanted by the concept Muslimism? The history of headscarf as a 
type of regional dress, belonging to a geography, belonging to a tradition of 
dressing oneself; a history in which it is generally not easy to distinguish the 
regional and the religious traditions is robbed as the form fixes it. Of course, 
it is not a geography, a tradition, a religion: through being fixed this 
richness becomes a tamed richness. Although the form is fixed, the concept 
is never fixed, nor abstract. It is filled with a situation, through which it 
reconstitutes a chain of causes and effects, motives and intentions. Surely, 
there are infinite numbers of signifiers of Muslimism. And here, the concept 
Muslimism has a formless and unstable unity due to the function, the 
functional unity of the myth. And the function of the myth is not to hide, nor 
to make disappear: the function of the myth is to distort.79 Myth functions 
through transforming history into nature: what causes mythical speech to be 
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uttered is perfectly explicit, but it is immediately frozen into something 
natural, it is not read as a motive, but as a reason.80  
Following Barthes’ advice that “the best weapon against myth is 
perhaps to mythify it in its turn, and to produce an artificial myth,”81 the 
best way is perhaps to try to create a new third chain, since it is not possible 
to defeat the myth from inside. It is not possible to defeat the myth form 
inside, because all one can do is to dismantle the signification, like a 
mythologist. But then, it is not possible to address the motivation of the 
myth when the form and meaning are distinguished. In other words, one 
would either trap in one possible readings of myth or would cancel the 
mythical signification. In the mythical speech of headscarf, what is got rid 
of is certainly not Muslimism: headscarf becomes the very fact of 
Muslimism. Hence, it is the drainage of richness of the geographical and 
religious history of scarf. However, what is draining out is also the religious 
history of Europe. The signifier Muslimism signifies in this third chain 
Europe’s flight from its own religious experience and also the experience of 
colonialism. When the meaning of headscarf is captured by Muslimism, the 
history of scarf belonging to monasteries and the villages becomes inflected, 
it evaporates. In the myth of headscarf, what is naturalized is the present 
state of relations between religion and society, the past experiences of 
endured violence and struggles to establish individual freedoms are distorted 
and frozen. In this way, Europeans’ own religious history is robbed. 
Moreover, what is robbed is the history of Muslims’ presence in European 
countries: not only the Muslims’ presences in Europe is restored anew, but 
more importantly, the history of Muslims living in European countries and 
of the way they found themselves in this old continent are robbed. This 
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myth signifies the presence of Muslims in Europe as a new and sudden 
occurrence, and the Muslim religious experience as something alien.  
The reader might have objections to this myth arguing that while 
making a reading of headscarf, there are many meanings (historical, 
religious, and cultural) of headscarf and every person might have a 
particular experience in wearing it. So the meanings of headscarf are not 
singular, nor fixed. It might be pointed out that in every instance of wearing 
scarf, under different circumstances, the signification of the myth would 
change. But, it is just the fixation of these meanings is what makes possible 
the problematization of headscarf. So, the myth of headscarf naturalizes 
Muslimism as an alien form of religious assertiveness which then might be 
constructed as a problem.  
Theft of History 
As proposed by the reading of headscarf as a myth, it is argued that 
the headscarf as having been mythified in Europe signifies Europe’s flight 
from its own religious experience and the experience of colonialism as well. 
Surely Muslimism has potentially an infinite number of signifiers; the myth 
of headscarf should not be taken as the sole signifier of Muslimism, as it is 
mythified in Europe. In the second chapter it has been discussed that 
Muslimism has been constructed as an alien and hostile religion, not only 
belonging to immigrants in Europe, but to the people in the Balkans as well. 
It has been thus argued that through the rhetoric of historicized antagonism 
between Muslimism and European civilization, Islam has been omitted from 
the history of Europe, and as such, and in being omitted it is an integral part 
of the formation of European identity. In the next section, on the other hand, 
the discourse of secularism will be evaluated and it will be proposed that it 
is through secularism that the concept of Muslimism is naturalized. The aim 
of this section is to show the relation between the myth of headscarf and the 
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Europe’s flight from its own religious and colonial history. Hence, we will 
be dealing with the third chain of the myth hereafter. 
If myth is speech-stolen, a theft of history, it is proposed that the 
myth of headscarf as it is mytified in European countries; it is the theft of 
the religious and colonial history of Europe. As mentioned in Europe’s 
distancing itself from its own past, the theft of colonial history is significant 
in the making of Europe identity, the past confrontations both on the 
continent82 and in the colonies. But the myth also naturalizes Muslimism in 
the sense that Muslim presence in Europe is presented as a new and sudden 
occurrence without a history. The numerous recent studies on the immigrant 
profiles and issues of integration do not contradict the signification of the 
myth. On the contrary, as discussed in Chapter 2, as the problems of the 
immigrants’ integration began to be considered in relation with the 
“problem of Islam,” primarily on the basis of cultural terms, the emergence 
of a new area of interest in “Muslim presence in Europe” coincides with the 
motivation of the myth of headscarf. This delineation of related issues 
around Muslimism in Europe eventually provides the ground on which the 
myth of headscarf becomes enunciable. Hence, instead of suggesting that 
the myth of headscarf alienates or estranges Muslimism, it is proposed here 
that it naturalizes Muslimism as a new presence, as peculiar to Europe83; not 
completely native, nor completely alien, in Europe but not of it.  
The claim that the myth of headscarf through naturalizing 
Muslimism robes the colonial history of European countries does not in any 
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way entail that there is a singular trajectory of colonial experience of these 
countries. Taking into account the fact that the colonial histories of these 
countries, France, Britain or Netherlands, for example, differ in character; it 
is not surprising that after de-colonization, they differ in their demeanor 
towards their ex-colonies and the policies developed in integrating or 
naturalizing their subjects in the homeland. Their colonial experiences 
fabricated their post-colonial attitudes. The character of various tensions 
around the immigrant groups after the 80’s, and the differences in the 
emergences of the headscarf debate are good indicators. So, the present 
multiculturalism of Britain has derived its tenets from the previous 
experiences and attitudes developed during colonial period while France, on 
the other hand, has retained its republican mission civilisatrice, in relation to 
its immigrants in the homeland. Yet, instead of trying to show the various 
conducts of colonialism in the past and making a projection of continuities 
with the recent policies of integration, it would be more appropriate to 
adhere here to the crucial point of the argumentation: whether the immigrant 
Muslims in Europe are ex-colonizeds or guest-workers, the stories of their 
coming to Europe are distorted; the peculiar identities are fixed in 
Muslimism as the form of headscarf has become fixed. Or, in other words, 
the manifest visibility of Muslimism blurs immigrants’ stories. 
The flight from colonial past might be intelligible; thanks to 
Benedict Anderson it is not implausible anymore to state that every nation 
has founded itself on an imagined community.84 Surely, this imaginary 
construction acts upon memory; on forgetting, on replacements and 
reconstructions. What is hard to discern in the myth of headscarf is the 
drainage of Europe’s own religious history. When the headscarf as a form of 
clothing is fixed in such a way that it came to signify Muslimism, the 
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meaning of scarf belonging to monasteries, religious education and rural life 
evaporates. Not only the religious and regional meanings of headscarf which 
has various stories are fixed in the form, but in this third chain, this fixation 
signifies a distortion of Christian past as well. As mentioned before, this 
type of fixation has not been pursued only in Europe: the headscarf has been 
mythified under various circumstances in Turkey, Algeria and Iran as well. 
It either came to signify anti-imperialism, or anti-colonialism, or an 
assertion of religious identity by rejecting modernization; the concepts 
which in each case were filled with different and peculiar situations. In this 
case, however, it is neither a simple negligence of Europeans in recognizing 
various types of Islamic scarves nor is it simply Islamic scarf’s regional and 
religious connotational differences. The headscarf is not mythified because 
there is a failure in reading its diverse connotations. It is an intentional 
attitude rather than a failure to conceive different meanings and styles of 
headscarves. The situation which fills the concept of Muslimism in Europe 
is motivated with secularism. This motive is so explicit that it seems futile 
to mention it. But in stating that secularism is not a reason but a motive, I 
claim that the myth of headscarf functions in such a way that secularism 
appears natural, whereas it is historical.  
Secularism and Religious Freedoms 
What is the point of reminding that secularism is not natural but 
historical, and more importantly ideological? How is the myth of headscarf 
connected with secularism as a political doctrine? It is useful to remind that 
whereas in France the scarves of Muslim students were regarded as in 
conflict with the secularity of the public education, in Germany the debate 
was primarily about securing the neutrality of teachers and public officers. 
In France, the debate evolved around the threatening presence of Muslim 
girls’ scarves in the public schools, as interjecting a religious sign into the 
secular public space. In Germany, on the other hand, the concern was 
primarily securing the neutrality of the state through the public officers and 
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teachers: a teacher should not impose any kind of faith, in any way, by 
his/her appearance. In Britain, however, the general tendency was to 
recognize Muslim headscarf as an affirmation of religious freedom and the 
main concern was avoiding it to become a communitarian sign of belonging 
to a group. Hence, the general attitudes toward plurality, different 
approaches to secularism in these countries have shaped the terms of the 
debates. In France, the wearing of headscarf was prohibited in public 
schools, some states in Germany restricted teachers and public officers from 
wearing headscarves, while in Britain, where public officers are able to wear 
scarves, only some schools made restrictions in certain classes, like gym, 
where the wearing was regarded as hazardous to health. Yet, the myth of 
headscarf is not about how its use was restricted. The myth of headscarf is 
about how the wearing-of-head-scarf has come to signify Muslimism in 
European countries. This section will try to discuss through reassessing the 
discourse of secularism that secularism is one of the major motives of the 
myth of headscarf. It will be consequently argued that the function of this 
myth is to distort the religious history of Europe while the tensions about the 
Muslim presence reveal the age-long controversies which were believed to 
be resolved.  
If we think of the relations between the state, society and religion in 
general, secularism is the normative doctrine, inevitably related with the 
doctrines of modernity. Secularism is a political and governmental doctrine 
which has its origins in nineteenth-century liberal society.85 Hence 
secularism has to be distinguished from secularization; the latter defined as 
the historical process through which first came the dissociation of church 
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and the state, and later the separation of religion from society.86 It should 
also be noted that the major movements which stimulated the dissociation of 
religion from society such as republicanism, nationalism, individualism and 
liberalism had been influential in European societies to a varying extent. 
The process of secularization in these societies does not display a singular 
path, which is finished or fulfilled everywhere. Furthermore, secularization 
was not ideally devised in advance, but was rather the outcome of the 
evolution of power struggles between trends and traditions such as the 
regalist tradition, catholic intransigentism, and liberal thinking.87  
When we approach secularization as a historical process through 
which the secular has emerged and found its own expression in a view of 
society, and moreover, when we define secularism as the worldview in 
which the relation between the society, religion and the state has become a 
normative model, we then need to define religion as well. This need 
presupposes awareness that throughout secularization, religion had to be 
defined and more conveniently “invented”.88 In the ancien régime when 
citizenship was not separated from denomination, the conducts of life were 
dominated by religion which was the supreme source of truth. Hence, the 
present concept of “religion” is a modern concept that has evolved together 
with the modern concept of the secular. The latest reinvention of religion 
has evolved around the debates on the “resurgence of religions” and 
primarily but not exclusively on recent Islamic movements.  
                                                 
86 Rémond, René. Religion and Society in Modern Europe. Trans. Antonia Nevill. 
Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999. p. 127.  
87 Ibid. p. 78.  
88 See, for a collection of papers discussing the invention of religion in different 
societies: Derek Peterson and Darren Walhof, eds. The Invention of Religion: Rethinking 
Belief in Politics and History. Rutgers University Press, 2002. 
 53
This recent concern for revival of religionism has focused on the 
potence of the political movements deriving their doctrines from religion in 
order to reform their societies, especially in those societies where the 
Muslims are in majority. Furthermore, in societies where secularization is 
thought to be fulfilled, in Western countries like USA and Britain, the 
present place of religion has been assessed in terms of religiosity and new 
forms of salvation movements. However, the debate of secularization thesis, 
that is, whether through modernity the societies are becoming more and 
more secular or the religious retains its force of change in diverse and subtle 
forms, fail to refer to religion as a whole. The identification of secularism 
with modernity has led to a degraded conception of religion as something 
that is polluting the society, something which should be circumscribed in a 
private space. “It is a fundamental assumption of the discourse of modernity 
that religion in modern societies loses its social creativity and forced to 
choose between a sterile conservation of its premodern characteristics and a 
self-effacing assimilation to the secularized world.”89 In evaluating the 
present stance of religion in western or non-western societies, religion is 
appraised through the marks of religiosity, for example, through church 
attendance or participation in religious practices, or through belief in an 
outworldly order. However, the place of religion should not be taken solely 
as the religious adherence of people; it should not be equated with faith. We 
should distinguish religion from spiritual movements in order to avoid 
reducing religion to a search for spirituality, or to a doctrine on 
transcendence.90 As well as providing a way to salvation and an approach to 
                                                 
89 van der Veer, Peter and Hartmut Lehman. “Introduction.” Nation and Religion: 
Perspectives on Europe and Asia. Eds. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. p. 10. 
90 For different approaches to address the present hollow as the religious lose 
dominance in modern societies, see: Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A 
Political History of Religion. Trans. Oscar Burge. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
 54
moral codes, religion should also be evaluated in the stable communities it 
produced and the institutions it has organized. We need a neutral stance to 
appreciate the religions historically, not only as dividing or undermining, 
but as uniting and promoting the populations as well.  
So, it is argued here that throughout the history of secularization in 
Western societies, especially in Western Europe, not only the secular has 
come to define a space and time, but the circumstances which made possible 
for the secular to emerge has also defined our present conception of religion. 
So the relation between the secular and the religious as epistemic concepts 
is not of a break, nor of a mere continuity. The secular is neither continuous 
with the religious (the secular is not the latest phase of a sacred origin); nor, 
is it its opposite.91 Hence, for example, the institution of civil registry which 
was the first initiative towards secularization92 did replace the validity of 
religious records; but, in the sense that it changed the notion of individual 
existence in society, it should not be considered as continuous with the 
previous religious registry.  The secular institutions whose secularity we 
tend to take for granted today definitely did not appear out of the blue, but 
they should not be regarded as the continuation of religious institutions 
stripped off their religiousness, either.  
The difficulty about secularism, as a doctrine on the relation between 
the individual as the locus of conscience and society, is that “it is closely 
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connected with the rise of a system of capitalist nation-states.”93 “It is an 
enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) 
redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self 
that are articulated through class, gender, and religion.”94 The identification 
of secularism with modernity finds its counterpart in the discourses of 
secularism which has served to the idea of “modernity” to become 
hegemonic as a political goal. Nation-state as the sign of modernity95 is 
founded on an imagined community of individual citizens whose relation 
with the state is secured from interruptions of irrational systems of beliefs 
and faiths. This is why the history of secularization coincides with the 
history of individualism: the privatization of morality and reason. The 
discourses of modernity, using dichotomies such as “private” and “public”, 
“political” and “personal”, “individual” and “social” have conceptualized a 
universal category of “religion”, just like “nation”; both of whose 
universality are located in the history of Western expansion.96 Hence 
religion is a modern conception which has become a universal concept 
through the discourses of modernity.97
So modernity’s answer to the age-long question of where religion 
should belong is secularism. The answer is the private sphere, the 
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individual’s conscience and the personal, rather than the political and the 
public. Is it possible to think of societies that escape these categories? It 
might perhaps be possible to surpass their antagonism through considering 
these categories as intertwining rather than opposing categories, until they 
are replaced or become obsolete. So, the “private” and “public”, in 
necessitating each other, do not exclude one another. Instead, they can be 
thought of as overlapping under specific circumstances, under various social 
“anomalies.” Similarly, the “personal” and the “political” do not exclude 
one another: the areas where they overlap are sources of tension and change. 
These ruptures provide locations from where it is possible to posit new 
questions. 
One such rupture is between “individual” and “communal” with 
respect to religious freedoms. Although the modern state, through 
acknowledging freedom of conscience, confines the matters of faith and 
religious commitment to the private, the religious experience of an 
individual is recognized via the community one adheres to. So the religious 
practices, which include the participation in a community, are delineated by 
the modern state as the freedom of worship. The most rigorous confinement 
of religion to the private has been attained by the Law of Separation in 
1905, in France. This law brought about a strict separation between the state 
and religious institutions, asserted a refusal to recognize the existence of any 
religious existence and reduced religious experience to something strictly 
individual and purely private.98 The Law of Separation proclaimed that 
henceforward the Republic neither recognized nor subsidized or paid 
ministers’ salaries for any cult whatsoever. Moreover, France unilaterally 
annulled the treaty drawn up a century earlier with papacy, thus saving any 
clerical interference and securing individual liberty. However, although the 
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legislation asserted the idea of religion only as a private affair through its 
first article, the Republic guaranteed the freedom of forms of worship and 
hence recognized in a sense religion’s social aspect.99 But the application of 
this article has evolved in time. 
While the states evolved from confessional states, in which the 
principle of unity was religion, to secular nation-states, the states adopted a 
neutral approach to society in terms of religious commitments. “The nation 
appropriated the church’s concept of unity and secularized it.”100 One 
trajectory through which it is possible to trace the states’ becoming neutral 
is the legal recognition of denominations other than the national one. Under 
the sacral state where the state has a religion, tolerance of other 
denominations occurred with leaving the dissenters not to conform to the 
regulations of the official church, and generally through restricting certain 
rights secured to the subjects of the dominant denomination. The Protestant 
Reformation, the French Revolution, the spread of liberal thinking all 
influenced the dissociation of the political and religion. The recognition of 
other denominations and religions was crucial in establishing nations’ 
relation with their subjects of different denominations and religions as equal 
citizens. Due to liberal thinking, the freedom of conscience was based on 
the distinction between private sphere where religious beliefs belonged, and 
the public area where religion would have no base.101 Yet, the freedom of 
conscience which is an individual right to hold convictions different from 
the official one, does not necessitate freedom of worship: i.e. the freedom of 
religious minorities to celebrate their faith communally. Whereas the 
individual became the holder of faith, the communal rights to religious 
practices became a matter of much controversy and unrest. “Depending on 
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the country, liberty and equality between the cults were ensured either by 
extending to other confessions the conditions and benefits previously 
reserved for the only recognized religion [England], or through the state’s 
neutrality [Germany], or by the withdrawal of all recognition and the 
severing of all connections between state and religion [France].”102
If secularism is the answer to the religious question, it should be 
noted that the examples of European countries offer varying answers to 
where religion belongs. Acknowledging the rights of different 
denominations and religions in regard to the forms of worship did not 
necessitate the radical separation of the state and the religious institutions as 
exemplified by France. With the liberal tradition of contrasting “civil” with 
the confessional or religious, since 1872, any mention of religious 
adherence has been removed from administrative documents in France. 
From that day onwards no question relating to religious matters appeared on 
census forms, and this is why there is no official record providing accurate 
statistics on the religious diversity in France. 103 The number of followers of 
different religions and denominations is estimated largely upon opinion 
polls in France. Britain provides a different example in terms of the relation 
between state and religious institutions. Although Britain has marginalized 
religion to a private matter for individuals and is therefore a secular society, 
the Church of England is the National Church and the queen is the head of 
this state church. The bishops, who are appointed by the Crown on the 
recommendation of the prime minister, are present in the House of Lords.104 
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Since 1978 the choice has been made from a list of applicants drawn up by 
the church authorities.105 Germany, on the other hand, through its post-war 
legislation, recognized the diversity of churches and combined them 
officially with the life of the nation. Such recognition is profoundly 
employed in Netherlands due to the system known as “pillarization” which 
structures civil society around communities of believers that have been set 
up as equal partners.106 Influenced by the same principle of neutrality 
toward religious plurality, Germany legislated the ecclesiastical tax 
(Kirchensteuer) through which the state funds the churches on behalf of the 
individuals, on the basis of income unless the individuals declare on the 
contrary.107
Although whether a state has a religion or not, fails to be a common 
mark of secularity, the neutrality of the state still depends on its equal 
relationship with different cults. The Rushdie affair in England made 
evident that even in a country with long tradition of tolerance and liberalism 
where plurality of religious beliefs and practices are recognized as an 
advantage, claim of blasphemy against the prophet Muhammad or Koran 
was not recognized by the existing laws. The present blasphemy law was 
confined to Christianity. The difficulties of European countries to conduct a 
relationship with the Muslim communities have been addressed since such 
conflicts became a part of public debate. Unlike other denominations and 
religions which were tolerated and later came to be recognized by the states, 
the Muslim populations did not have religious organizations to represent 
them and negotiate with the state for better participation and 
acknowledgement. Moreover, a singular source of authority to decide on the 
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religious issues is absent for the Muslim people in Europe. They either refer 
to the religious authorities in their country of origin or their representative in 
their host countries, if it ever exists. In order to solve this problem of 
representation and lack of an organization to negotiate with, countries like 
England and France initiated the formations of Islamic organizations. In 
Germany, a branch of Turkish religious governmental office (Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı) is present since 1984, providing services and education for the 
largely Turkish originated Muslims. The Muslim Council of Britain was 
founded in 1997 as an umbrella organization in Britain. In France, the 
French Council of the Muslim Faith was set up as a private organization by 
the Minister of the Interior Nicholas Sarkozy in 2003. The association has 
no legal standing but it is de facto representative of French Muslims before 
the national government.  
The neutrality of the state in relation to religion, its recognition of 
plurality of forms of beliefs on equal footing necessitated solving various 
problems such as the financing of religious orders, the legal status of 
confessional institutions such as schools and hospitals, the content and 
obligation of religious education in public schools, just to mention a few. In 
this respect, whether the Muslim organizations would evolve to a status able 
to fulfill what are expected of them both by their followers and the 
governments, depends on various factors. On the one hand, since there was 
no hierarchical religious organization in Islam for Muslims in Europe until 
recently, there is the difficulty of representing the diversity of Islamic faith. 
The Muslim people in European countries present great differences in their 
understanding of Islamic faith and practices; whether they will be 
represented or would like to be represented by these organizations remain to 
be a question which will be answered in time. On the other hand, if they 
retain their character of being initiated or founded by the governments, they 
may not acquire an independent status and would become largely the 
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spokesperson of the state to Muslim populations, rather than the other way 
round.  
Apart from the neutrality of the state and recognition of plurality of 
religious communities, the religious question is also largely about the 
individual and the social; the secularization of the society, political and civil 
alike. The religion is not only made up of institutions and orders, but to a 
great extent it is the source of moral values and codes. In this respect, the 
secularization of the individual conduct continued in the twentieth century, 
especially during the 60s when a demand for individual autonomy was 
expressed profoundly. This was a movement demanding the dissociation of 
moral values venerated by religions and those of civil society in order to 
liberate personal conduct from the judgments of religious institutions, as 
well as from states. The legislations on moral issues were conforming to the 
religious teachings until the 60s. The penal code was modeled on the moral 
code: what religion defined as a sin was legally a crime or a 
misdemeanor.108 Owing to the movement of 60s, the legislations on divorce, 
adultery, abortion, contraception and homosexuality were reformed in order 
to diverge from the moral codes of the religious teachings. However, the 
separation of the moral codes and legal codes does not entail that religion 
ceased to be a source of morality in personal conducts. Nevertheless, it 
definitely withdrew from the area of legislation from where it intervened 
with private and governed individual conduct.  
The presence of Muslim people in European countries and their 
demands to retain their cultural and religious identities creates a tension in 
the societies. As the religious practices of Muslim people become more 
visible, they bring forth the questions about the place of religion in modern 
and secular societies, the questions which were thought to have been solved. 
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The debate on the presence of Muslim scarf in public schools evolved to 
include issues about the presence of other religious signs like crucifixes or 
the clothes of teachers from religious orders. On the one hand, the extent to 
which European countries would acknowledge the religious rights of 
Muslim people depends upon Muslim communities’ and organizations’ 
ability to formulate and justify their demands in the terminology of modern 
liberal state. In doing this, they would surely and are already upsetting the 
conventions. On the other hand, the different trajectories of secularization 
and religious freedoms define and limit the countries’ present attitudes 
toward extending the rights of other cults to Islam. 
The analysis of the myth of headscarf in European countries not only 
reveals the intention to naturalize the presence of Islam in Europe, but also 
surfaces the age-long conflicts about the place of religion in today’s society. 
The myth of headscarf boomerangs in the face of a European identity which 
founds itself through distancing from its religious and colonial history. 
Furthermore, this analysis provides the ways to suggest that the present state 
of relations between religion, state and society was a modus vivendi; not a 
resolution, nor an outcome of a natural and logical argumentation.  
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Conclusion  
Against all the comments and speeches of our politicians which we 
witness through the channels of communication everyday, it is curious how 
a manner of clothing oneself or an act of torching cars can become a 
political statement. The public space has never been an open space 
providing each and everyone an equal reach. It is mostly a demanded space 
where the limits of being able to speak up are the limits of being able to be 
heard. But is it possible to hear the statements which come up in unusual 
forms or do we (others) construct and construe these acts into statements, so 
that we can reply, react, analyze or dismiss them? Or rather, are not the 
manners in which these acts enter into the public space related with how 
they are considered as statements?  
A decade and more after veiling had been interpreted as a political 
statement in support of the Islamic movement in Algeria, the recent riot in 
France failed to be considered as a statement at all. The unrest which incited 
at the end of October 2005 in the banlieues of French cities shouts to be 
heard. In the worst social turmoil the country has ever seen since the unrest 
of 1968, thousands of vehicles have been set alight in nearly 300 towns, 
over 1,500 people have been arrested in the first two weeks. The arson 
attacks which targeted the schools and kindergartens as well seem to be 
diminished substantially after a month. The incident which triggered the 
rioting is the death of two teenagers on October 27th, who apparently 
believing themselves to be pursued by the police, were electrocuted in an 
electricity substation in the suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. The hard line 
policing policy and the affronting language of Nicholas Sarkozy, the 
Minister of Interior, have been criticized to be provocative. The reasons of 
such a violent incident need to be sought out. But the attempts to explain the 
situation are inevitably confined in our vocabulary. The question whether 
any explanation or analysis of this incident is not at once violence on the 
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rioting youngsters’ acts is a legitimate question if we acknowledge the 
political dimensions of hearing and making hearable.  
So, who are these young people rioting and what do they say? They 
are definitely not immigrants. They are mostly French citizens although they 
are being referred to as the second or third generation of immigrants largely 
of North African origin. But unlike the multiculturalism which favors 
hyphenated identities across and beyond the channel, it is discriminatory to 
address someone with his/her origin in France. In a country where 
integration policies are founded on Republican ideals, the suggestion of 
affirmative action or mention of plurality is considered as derogatory. Yet 
the term “minority” is problematic as well, not only in France: the concept 
of “minority” conflicts with the notion of equality substantiated with 
citizenship. While citizenship proclaims a mathematical and logical 
equality, the notion of minority suggests a qualitative dimension, not 
necessarily related with numbers.109 The French republican system of 
leveling all identities to a neutral notion of citizenship does not supply any 
space to name diversities, or when it does that, it does so to criticize 
differences. On the other hand, the multicultural approach of England seems 
to provide a vocabulary to define differences from the dominant society. 
The British approach of recognition when compared to the French style of 
integration seems to work better in involving the children of minorities to 
the society. Yet addressing the term “minorities” at once introduces and 
justifies the division between the dominant and the liminal segments of 
society. Recognition through celebrating cultural differences risks or 
deepens segregation.  
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It could have been easy to analyze the revolt in France if it had 
expressed itself along communal, ethnic or religious lines. However the 
riots were neither communal, nor ethnic; the riots were not organized by 
leaders and they did not transform into a political project.110 Unlike the 
previous ethnic and religious stigmatizations, this recent turmoil calls upon 
acknowledging the economical dimensions of the predicaments of 
integration. It is not possible to call these rioting young and angry people as 
“Arabs” or “Muslims” anymore. Yet, it is not simply “the poor against the 
rich” either. The difficulties faced at the first moment of describing the 
rioters summarize the violence of language. The act of defining another 
person’s identity and his/her act of demonstrating his/her presence is 
violent.   
It has been argued in this dissertation that the speech of headscarf is 
a mythified speech as it occurred in Europe. The myth of headscarf speaks 
of the turmoil in European countries expressing the growing anxieties about 
the presence of Islam which is feared to invade Europe from inside, through 
the Muslim populations. Yet, the myth of headscarf, in an overt and 
profound manner, also speaks of the formation of a European identity 
through quieting a vehement past. The myth of headscarf functions to 
naturalize the Muslim presence and a secular way of living. The cultural and 
religious meanings of headscarf are diminished and the ways the Muslim 
populations arrived in European countries are obscured.  
The myth of headscarf is also about the ways through which an 
artifact begins to enunciate something. It is also about the ideological 
hollow between what is being said and what is being heard. The measures 
taken in response to riots in France, especially the reactivation of the law 
about the state of emergency which was legislated during the Algerian war 
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in 1955 and which had never been applied to metropolitan France, 
demonstrate that what is expressed in this revolt is not being heard. It would 
be unwise not to predict that in case of a negligence to recognize the target 
of this rage, a new turmoil would shout more fiercely upon a triggering 
incident. These people torched the boundaries which made them invisible, 
unheard, not present. This riot is a manifestation that the colony is now in 
France: France will either continue to colonize these people through closure 
and refusal, or will choose to decolonize herself through facing her own 
colonial past.  
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